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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
.AT RICHMOND 
GEORGE EDWARD PICKETT KENT 
v. 
ANNE MILLER, AN INFANT, ETc. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF IN ERROR 
In our petition for a writ of error, which we have 
adopted as our brief, we have set forth the grounds 
upon which, in our opinion, this Court should reverse 
the judgment of the lower Court, and have given and 
argued the reasons for these contentions. We shall 
not burden this Court with restating in this brief the 
argument contained in our petition for a writ of error. 
We do, however, rely upon the grounds stated in such 
petition and upon the correctness of the principles 
therein contended for. 
1 
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FACTS. 
In their brief, counsel for defendant-in-error have 
inadvertently misst~ted some of the facts. At top of 
page 3 of the brief of the defendant in error is found 
the following, "The plaintiff got in the automobile 
with Mr. and Mrs. Kent and defendant closed the 
door of the car and they started home''. On page 39 
of the record is found Miss Miller's own version of 
this phase of the matter: 
"Q Miss Miller, about ·what time was it that 
you left the Club house Y 
"A It was a little after 12 :00. 
"Q That would be the morning of January 
25th then Y · 
"A Yes. 
'' Q Who was it that you stopped at the door to 
talk to as you went out the door Y 
. ''A Clarence Armstrong. 
"Q Is he hereY 
"A Yes. 
'~Q Where were Mr. Kent and Miss Wright at 
that time' 
''A They were in the car. 
'' Q They had already gotten into the carY 
"A Yes. 
And again on Page 48, on cross-examination, Miss 
Miller testified as follows: 
'' Q Tell me just what occurred when you de-
cided to leave' 
- .. . . 
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''A Lillian came back to the table and Kent 
said, 'If you are ready to go, I am ready' and we 
left. 
'' Q And they went first, I believe you said. 
"A Yes. , 
''Q Wentaheadofyou' 
"A Yes. 
'' Q And then you went out and you got into the 
car and they \vere already in the car and you got in 
your right hand side, is that correct' 
"A Yes." 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no evidence 
in the plaintiff's own story 9f this phase of the matter 
which would justify counsel's statement that defend-
ant closed the door of the car. 
As to this phase of the matter, Mr. Kent himself 
testified as follows: (R. p. 86) 
''A We left around midnight before the crowd 
-before the Club closed. We wanted to get back 
early and we all left together. I helped the ladies 
in the car, Miss Wright first and Miss Miller, 
slammed the door got nnderneath the wheel from 
the left side and departed.'' 
Under the plaintiff's own version of this phase of 
the matter, she herself must have shut the door and 
she is bonnd by her own statement. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record tend-
ing to prove that the door was improperly latched. 
In the trial Court's opinion, is found the following: 
''The door may have been incorrectly latehed. 
or she n1ay have been thrown or fallen in some 
other manner. '' 
As stated in our petition for a writ of error, it is 
clear that the jury was permitted to speculate as to 
whether or not the plaintiff was thrown from the car 
because of the door being incorrectly latched or in 
some other manner. A verdict in Virginia cannot be 
based upon speculation. In this connection it is well 
to remember that the road over which the parties in· 
volved travelled from the Riverside Club to the point 
of the accident was quite a bumpy road and it is com-
mon lrnowledge that the door of a car improperly 
latched, while travelling over a bumpy road, will be 
noisy, and yet there is no evidence in the record tend-
ing to show that any one in the car had any intimation 
that the door was improperly latched, if such was 
the case. 
On Page 7 of the brief of defendant-in-error is 
found the following statement: 
''The jury lmew and this Honorable Court 
Court knows that persons do not threaten to jump 
or jump fro1n fast moving automobiles without 
provocation or reason. It is not mere 'heedless-
ness, inattention, inadvertence that causes per-
sons to become so frightened and fearful of 
their o'Yn safety". 
There is no evidence that the plaintiff at any time 
threatened to jump from the car. According to her 
testimony she asked the defendant to slow up or to 
please let h~~ get out. . 
5 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE JUDGMENT 
OFTHETR~LCOURTANDENTERJUDGMENT 
FOR THE DEFENDANT (IN THE COURT BELOW) 
IN THIS COURT 
The reasons why this Court should enter final 
judgment for the defendant are: 
1. The plaintiff has failed to prove gross negligence 
on the part of the defendant. This question has been 
discussed by us on Pages 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 ·of the 
record. 
2. A verdict cannot be based upon speculation or 
conjecture. This question is discussed on Pages 15 
and 16 of the record. 
3. The plaintiff's story is incredible. This question 
is discussed on Pages 16 and 17 of the record. 
We shall not burden the Court with a restatement 
of our argument on these three questions, but respect-
fully submit that any one of the three principles con-
tended for is sufficient gronnd for the reversal by this 
Court of the judgment of the lower Court and the 
entry of final judgment for the defendant herein. 
THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE LOWER COURT AND AWARD 
ANEW TRIAL 
The assignments of error numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
deal with either the improper gTanting of plaintiff's 
instruction over objection by defendant, or the refusal 
to grant proper instructions offered by defendant. We 
shall not reargue all of these assignments of error, 
since the erroneous ruling of the lower Colll:'t in respect 
6. 
to any one of these assignments of error, would 
entitle defendant to a new trial and since the grant-
ing of plaintiff's instruction No.4, over objection of 
defendant, is so apparently erroneous, we shall con-
fine our remarks in this brief to assignment of error 
No.6. 
To clarify this discussion, we again quote Instruc-
tion No.4 (granted): 
''The Court instructions the jury that where 
one by his own negligence creates an emergency 
or puts another in a dilemma whereby such other 
is force to make a sudden choice of two or more 
courses that even though such other chooses the 
unwise course, the law by reason of the emergency 
existing excuses such other for such unwise choice 
if such tmwise choice would have been chosen by 
a ~easonably prudent person under the circum-
stances." 
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the plain-
tiff made any choice whatsoever, but according to her 
own testimony, she ·was involuntarily thrown from the 
defendant's automobile. Under this Instruction No.4, 
the jury was permitted to consider whether or not the 
plaintiff was, under the circumstances, justified in 
jumping from the car because of an emergency, while 
this is diametrically opposed to the plaintiff's own 
version of how the accident occurred. Miss Miller 
(R. p. 38) described the accident as follows: 
''Still he didn't pay any attention to me and he 
went around this sharp curve and didn't pay any 
attention to where he ·was going or what he was . 
'1. 
doing and we went around this sharp curve and 
the door came open and I fell out.'' 
... 
In this connection we beg to quote from Page 12 of-
the brief of the defendant-in-error, Miss Miller: 
''THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT JUMP OUT 
OF THE CAR." 
''The plaintiff as a \vitness under oath denied 
that she jumpe.d out of the car and the jury ac-
cepted her statement as true and it is encumbent 
upon this Honorable Court to likewise accept it 
as true.'' 
In this connection the Court's attention is respect-
fully called to Page 2 of the petition for a writ of 
error, where there is set forth the basis of the plain-
tiff's case, as made out by her ·pleadings. Her ·-bill 
of particulars has the following to . say: 
"2. That the defendant drove his car at an 
excessive ·rate of speed, taking several sharp 
curves at such rate of speed and that plaintiff 
was protesting at the time that he took the last 
curve while she was in the car that he took so 
fast that it threw her towards the door, which 
opened, throwing her out; * * * '' 
Hence -it will be seen that the Court below permitted 
the case to go to the jury upon an· entirely different 
theory than that which was adopted by the plaintiff 
in her pleadings and upon which she based her right 
to .~ecQver. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that we have covered, in our petition for 
a writ of error every phase of the matter discussed in 
the brief of the defendant-in-error. We respectfully 
invite the Court's attention to the discussion as set 
forth in our said petition. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the reversal of the judgment of the lower 
Court and the entry of a final judgment for the de-
fendant in this Court would be in accord with the 
former decisions of this Court governing ''guest 
cases'', and such action by this Court is respectfully 
requested. Should this Court, however, disagree with 
us in this respect, it is requested that the judgment of 
the lower Court be reversed and a new trial awarded 
upon any one of the grounds set forth in assignments 
of error 4;, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
··'--
Respectfully submitted, 
P ABRISH, BUTCHER AND PARRISH. 
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